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Kierkegaard’s ‘Repetition’ and Pilgrimage
Stephen Haller
Associate Professor, Wilfrid Laurier University-Brantford Campus, Canada
shaller@wlu.ca
In 1843, the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard wondered whether it was possible to
repeat an experience. He attempted to relive experiences he once had in Berlin by
revisiting haunts of his earlier self. After several days, he concluded that his repetition of
experience was unsuccessful. Many people make similar attempts at repetition when
they make, for example, the pilgrimage to Camino de Santiago multiple times. What
could a person hope to gain by this repetition?
What prevents successful repetition, suggests Kierkegaard, is beginning with the end in
mind rather than traveling merely to collect random impressions. Repetition fails, argues
Kierkegaard, when it is tried as some kind of experiment rather than a commitment, and
this failure of immersion makes us a passive observer of ourselves.
An authentic repetition, he argues, can only happen after one surrenders control of
events. One must give something up to get anything back. To experience Berlin again,
or to repeat a pilgrimage, one must give up expectations and surrender to whatever
unfolds. In this way, the repeat traveler would surrender the objective stance of someone
comparing events with earlier ones. Instead, they would be actively engaged, and thus
able to actually re-experience something like what happened before. In contrast to
passively ‘recollecting’ past events, Kierkegaard advises that a successful ‘repetition’ is
to live with a repeatedly renewed commitment to living in the present. Repetition is,
paradoxically, not about the past but, rather, about ‘the earnestness of existence.’
Pilgrims, however, often try on identities and roles in attempts to experience what they
have heard of in other pilgrim’s stories. It may be that some repeat pilgrims are not so
much nostalgically reliving their previous experiences, as trying to experience what
others have experienced, and that they themselves did not experience the first time. It
will be argued that this imitation of life can never be fully engaged in, and thus, it will
always be disappointing because it necessarily involves self-consciously observing
oneself in the role.
Key Words: Kierkegaard, repetition, pilgrimage, authenticity, repeatable pleasures,
exhaustible pleasures, Camino de Santiago

A Personal Camino Story

coils for holy incense; and mistakenly
attributed a whiff of clove cigarette smoke to
the fragrance of flowers (Iyer, 1989). He
supposed, however, that these false associations
were the result of the truly magical context that
Bali provides. I wondered whether magic
awaited me if I simply learned to expect it. In
Roncesvalles, as the halos of light above my
bunk were slowly dimmed, I wondered what
associations I would be making down the road.

I climbed up the ladder to the top bunk and
prepared for my first night on the Camino de
Santiago. After squirming into my sleeping bag,
I rolled a couple of bright orange, foamy
earplugs between my fingers, and inserted them
gently. As they expanded, the rustling sounds of
my fellow travelers slowly faded until I was
alone in muffled silence. I lay on my back and
noticed for the first time the impressive lighting
fixtures suspended overhead which supplied an
inescapable spiritual image. There were dozens
of very large halos hanging down from the
towering ceiling and illuminating all the
sleeping pilgrims.

The pilgrimage did indeed cast its spell on me
that year. The magic wasn’t there, however,
when I returned four years later to repeat the
experience. I took the same bus ride from
Pamplona to Roncesvalles, the streets were
similarly slick with rain, I was served virtually
the same meal of pasta, trout and fries, and I
slept in the same cavernous old monastery
brimming with bunk beds. A couple of days

When the travel writer Pico Iyer first visited the
paradisiacal island of Bali, Indonesia, he
mistook the toxic, chemical smoke of mosquito
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Berlin again, or to repeat a pilgrimage, one must give
up expectations and surrender to whatever unfolds. In
this way, the repeat traveller would surrender the
objective stance of someone comparing events with
earlier ones. Instead, they would be actively engaged,
and thus able to actually re-experience something like
what happened before. In contrast to passively
‘recollecting’ past events, Kierkegaard advises that a
successful ‘repetition’ is to live with a repeatedly
renewed commitment to living in the present.
Repetition is, paradoxically, not about the past but,
rather, about ‘the earnestness of existence.’

later I walked back into Pamplona and tried
hard to repeat other experiences and, similarly,
failed to recapture their essence. I dined again
in the Café Iruna frequented by Hemmingway,
and made famous in his account of drunken
debauchery The Sun Also Rises. I sat on the
same bench and sketched the same bell-tower I
had sketched years before. The second time
around for these experiences was just not as
inspiring. The exoticness of my first café con
leche, or the thrill of my first tapas bar can only
be experienced with fresh eyes. After
completing the walk of 800 km I arrived in
Santiago de Compostella - but not for the first
time, and the second time around cannot
compare.

Introduction
With the entire world to discover, tourists regularly
return to the same familiar places. According to one
survey, 80% of Canadians:
are likely to return to the same place over and
over again for a holiday. And eat the same
dishes. At the same restaurants (Byers, 2013:
T6).
Many people make similar attempts at repetition when
they make, for example, the pilgrimage to Camino de
Santiago multiple times. What could a person hope to
gain by this repetition?
In 1843, the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard
wondered what could be gained or lost in repetitive
experience (Kierkegaard, 1983). He attempted to relive
experiences he once had in Berlin by revisiting haunts
that he remembered with fondness. After several days,
he concluded that his attempt at repetition of
experience was unsuccessful. He was unable to reexperience the same joys and pleasures of his earlier
self.
What prevents successful repetition, suggests
Kierkegaard, is beginning with the end in mind rather
than travelling merely to collect random impressions.
Repetition fails, argues Kierkegaard, when we become
passive observers of ourselves instead of fully
immersed in present experience. When one makes
comparisons with earlier experiences, one adopts a
passive, objective stance, and our experience becomes
a kind of experiment rather than a commitment.
An authentic repetition, he argues, can only happen
after one surrenders control of events. One must give
something up to get anything back. To experience
~ 11 ~

Pilgrimages are largely defined in terms of their target
destination, and thus it seems, by definition, begin with
the end in mind. There is always a special destination,
such as Santiago de Compostella, or Lourdes. Thus,
according to Kierkegaard’s criterion, it might be
thought that there would be nothing to gain from
repeating the experience. However, if one’s motivation
for the pilgrimage is to transform oneself through
voluntary hardship, or some other process of inner
transformation, then this process is not diminished with
repetition.
Pilgrims, however, often exacerbate the problem of
repletion by trying on identities and roles in attempts to
experience what they have heard of in the stories of
other pilgrims. It may be that some repeat pilgrims are
not merely nostalgically reliving their previous
experiences, as trying to experience what others have
experienced, and that they themselves may not have
experienced the first time. It will be argued that this
imitation of life can never be fully engaged in, and
thus, it will always be disappointing because it
necessarily involves self-consciously observing oneself
in the role.

Kierkegaard’s Attempt at Repetition
Kierkegaard also wondered whether it was possible to
repeat an experience, and whether there might be
‘anything gained or lost’ in the process. (Kierkegaard,
1983: 131) So, he decided to conduct a psychological
experiment and attempted to re-live some pleasant
experiences he once had in Berlin. The results are
described as
an investigative journey . . . to test the
possibility and meaning of repetition
(Kierkegaard, 1983: 150).
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Constantin Constantius, the pseudonym used by
Kierkegaard in this story, has fond memories of
experiencing Berlin churches by moonlight. He can
still visualize the act of climbing the stairs to his old
flat, which he has ascended countless times again in his
memory, towards the gas-lit entry. He yearns to
actually repeat these experiences, and so he returns to
Berlin, rents the same apartment with the same
furniture from the same landlord, and visits the same
haunts of his earlier self. He arrives excited to find
things pretty much the same - a glass door, a writing
table, an armchair upholstered in red velvet - and
enthused about his likely success. It doesn’t take long,
however, for him to discover that not all things in
Berlin are as static as his old furniture. Taking coffee
in the local café doesn’t make his spirits soar as it used
to. His landlord is not as much fun to talk to because,
instead of rakishly singing the praises of his
bachelorhood, he now congratulates himself on his
sedate married life. After several days of visiting
theatres, sitting in the same seats, and returning to
restaurants that he had frequented daily in his earlier
life, he concludes that a repetition of his experience is
impossible, and wearily returns home.

Three Reasons for Repetition: Emphasis,
Ritual, Imitation
So why do travellers repeat journeys they have made
before? With our limited life, is it not better to escape
routine, and to take risks that come with being open to
new experiences, rather than repeating things a second
time?
1) Emphasis
Kierkegaard suggests that the act of repetition can
produce emphasis, such as when a speaker repeats the
same phrases in order to signify their importance, or
bangs their hand on the table over and over again.
(Kierkegaard, 1983) Perhaps, similarly, the tourist
wishes to emphasize fading memories by rehearsing
them over again anew in order to deepen the
impressions. For example, Andre Gidé writes of his
protagonist Michel in The Immoralist, that by returning
to Spain he was hoping to:
rediscover [his memories of] a purer sky, of
sharper shadows, of . . . laughter and song
(Gide, 1970: 12).
José Saramago discusses the act of repetition in one of
his notebooks on travel, and implies that repetition is
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required to fill in gaps of a past experience:
The end of one journey is simply the start of
another. You have to see what you missed the
first time, see again what you already saw, see
in springtime what you saw in summer, in
daylight what you saw by night, see the sun
shining where you saw the rain falling, see the
crops greening, the fruit ripening, the stone
moved from one place to another, the shadow
that was not there before. You have to retrace
your footsteps, either to tread them again, or to
plant fresh ones alongside them. You have to
start the journey over. Always (Saramago,
2000: 443).
Thus, repetition improves understanding. Each time we
re-read a book, or view a film twice, our grasp of the
content deepens. It might even be true that one must
read a book twice before one can really know it. When
a musician plays the same tune repeatedly on a violin,
they gain a deeper understanding of it, in the sense that
they start to feel it and play it intuitively, rather than
thinking consciously about what they are doing.
Similarly, one might need to experience places twice in
order to know them better. The first time one visits
London or Paris, one is impressed by every little detail,
simply because they are unfamiliar. A second visit
might allow one’s focus to move beyond novel details,
and reveal a deeper, structural, understanding of the
bare bones of the place. Pilgrims walking the same
pilgrim trail repetitively will gain a deeper appreciation
of local history, flowers and birds, and the
philosophical insights specific to walking.
By returning to a place, and finding familiarity in the
stores, restaurants and walks, one can make the new
place feel like home. One feels less like a tourist when
one recognizes the landscape and does not need
directions. This increased understanding comes at a
cost however. By making the exotic more familiar, one
must give up the magic of newness.
2) Ritual
Repetition can be devotional. The film critic Roger
Ebert wrote in his memoirs that he was always seeking
to repeat experiences on his travels, and he likened it to
a sacred ritual:
I’ve been back to the café several times again,
always hoping for the same seat at the same
table. Such returns are an important ritual to
me (Ebert, 2011: 135).
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Much of religious experience is expressed through
repetition. The repetition of phrases over and over
again, or the repetition of steps on a pilgrimage, can
mimic cyclical and eternal natural rhythms such as the
cycles of morning, day and night, of the work day, of
the seasons, of life and death, of breathing, and heart
rate. This ‘repetition,’ writes Luc Ferry:
guarantees that they cannot be forgotten . . .
[and this] . . . achieves a kind of
‘immortality’ (Ferry, 2011: 35).
3) Imitation
Repetition, by its very nature, is second-hand, and this
can have negative connotations. Rebecca Solnit, in
Wanderlust, notes that sacred pilgrimages are defined
by repetition and imitation of those who came before:
To follow a route, [she writes] is to accept an
interpretation, or to stalk your predecessors . . .
To walk the same way is to reiterate something
deep, to move through the same space the same
way is a means of becoming the same person,
thinking the same thoughts (Solnit, 2001: 68).
This can be a good thing, as following in the footsteps
of others can be a way of emulating admirable role
models in the hopes of forging the same virtues in
oneself. The Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle
famously emphasized this benefit of repetition. He
argued that one’s character is shaped by what one
repeatedly does. Virtue, he notes, is created by
repetitive habit, not particular actions. So, by repeating
the same behaviour we reinforce our characters and
change them into something desirable. (Adler, 1997)
However, imitation of others is also famously derided
by existentialist philosophers as being inauthentic.
Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil (1885),
admonishes those who follow the ‘herd’ (Scruton et al.,
2010). Kierkegaard advises that authenticity requires
making one’s own decisions rather than following the
same path as others (Collins, 1968). Sartre claims that
it is ‘bad faith’ to adopt the ways and accepted beliefs
of others rather than fearlessly facing one’s radical
freedo. (Detmer, 2008). Thus, there is a danger of
counterfeit mimicry in repetition of experience.
Repeat pilgrims on the Camino de Santiago run the risk
of being trapped in such inauthenticity. They might not
be attempting to nostalgically re-live their previous
experiences, as desperately trying to experience what
they expected to the first time around, but failed. A
compulsion to do things twice might sometimes be an
~ 13 ~

attempt to experience what they failed to experience
the first time. This is especially true on the Camino de
Santiago, where one hears many hyperbolic stories
about aligning yourself with the stars, being at one
with the universe, finding the extraordinary in the
ordinary, and learning ‘lessons’ on life. One can feel
cheated, or inadequate if these experiences are not
actually manifested. This lack can be felt in any tourist
experience, of say, Paris’ Left Bank where impossibly
romantic expectations are built up. If the pilgrim
cannot become the transformed person they have heard
about, there is a strong temptation to fake it simply by
mimicking the motions and imitating those who came
before.
What has gone wrong, suggests Kierkegaard, is that
they have begun with the end in mind. It is rather like
what happens to the traveller who travels merely ‘to
smell what everybody else has smelled’ (Kierkegaard,
1983: 153). Such people see only the iconic sights, and
follow a guide book rigidly in order to experience
approved activities. They have routine itineraries, and
prescribed responses to experiences. He similarly
criticizes theatre goers who only attend a performance
if they know in advance what will happen, and if it has
been pre-approved by the opinions of others.
To illustrate his point, Kierkegaard uses an analogy of
a young lover whose ‘mistake was that he stood at the
end instead of at the beginning’ (Kierkegaard, 1983:
137). Because of this mistake, the role of the actual
woman with whom he was in love was, in fact,
superfluous. She was merely the proxy used to awaken
in him poetic feelings of love that he wanted. He
wanted to be in love, but with whom he was in love did
not seem to really matter. His love fails because is
merely a pretence. Analogously, if a pilgrim begins a
journey with the specific aim of imitating others, they
will never reach that target.
Tourists often try on identities and roles. In attempts to
behave the way they think movie stars behave, they
indulge in luxury, conspicuous consumption, and status
seeking. For a time, they pretend that luxury hotels and
trendy locations are their natural habitat. This
unnecessary link between luxury and tourism is fixed
in the minds of many. People who live frugally in their
day to day lives often feel compelled to spend lavishly
when they visit Paris. Cruises are sold on their image
of romanticism and luxury from a previous era. Paul
Fussell notes that the motive of much tourism:
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between the wars . . . [was] . . . to derive secret
pleasure from posing momentarily as a member
of a social class superior to one’s own, to play
the role (Fussell 1980).
We often travel in order to play a role, to adopt an
alternate identity, and enter a fantasy world ‘en
Provence,’ or on the ‘Italian Riviera.’ This imitation of
life, however, can never be fully engaged in. It will
always be disappointing because it necessarily involves
self-consciously observing oneself in the role.
Kierkegaard describes such behaviour as a mere ‘jest’
and trying to ‘be somebody’ (Kierkegaard, 1983: 133).
Instead of beginning with a pre-decided goal,
Kierkegaard advises, one should adopt the way of the
‘careless wanderer’ who travels merely to collect
random impressions (Kierkegaard, 1983:153). ‘The
whole thing,’ he writes, ‘is achieved by accidental
concretion’ (Kierkegaard, 1983) which can only
happen after one surrenders control of events.

Authentic Repetition
The essential thing involved in an authentic repetition,
argues Kierkegaard, is that one must stop trying so
hard to achieve it. Kierkegaard’s attempt at repetition
fails, concludes editor Robert Bretall, ‘because it is an
attempt and because it is pursued’ (Bretall, 1946:136).
A main theme in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, is that you
have to give something up to get it back. He illustrates
this concept, famously in Fear and Trembling, with an
analogy to the Old Testament story of Abraham and
Isaac (Kierkegaard, 1983). When God commanded
Abraham to sacrifice his only son Isaac, the only way
to absorb this request was to give up searching for a
rational explanation for this highest of demands.
However, and precisely because of this surrender,
everything was returned to Abraham, and the sacrifice
was made unnecessary by God’s intervention.
Similarly, argues Kierkegaard, one must pursue all life
with such a commitment to accepting whatever
happens. To love, one must be prepared to give it up.
Analogously, one could argue, to enjoy a film, one
must suspend their disbelief. At one level, the viewer
knows that a cinematic experience is unreal, with
written dialogue, sets, and actors. However, if the
viewer is able to successfully surrender themselves to
the movie, then they will get something back in the
form of a richer involvement.
For Kierkegaard to experience Berlin again, he needed
to give up expectations and surrender himself to
~ 14 ~

whatever unfolds. In this way, he would need to
surrender his objective stance of a passive viewer and
‘reporter’ of events, which was needed for
comparisons with earlier experiences. Instead, he
would be actively engaged, and thus able to actually re
-experience something like what happened before. One
must experience things directly, through active
decision making, in contrast to passively ‘recollecting’
past events, which leads to frustration, since
experiences cannot actually be duplicated. Kierkegaard
advises that a ‘repetition’ is not a temporary
experiment but, rather, is a renewed commitment to
live repeatedly in the present. So, repetition is,
paradoxically, not about the past but about ‘the
earnestness of existence’ (Kierkegaard, 1983: 133).
The English author and essayist Julian Barnes uses this
very language when describing Edith Wharton’s
attitude towards tourism while motoring around France
in 1907. For Wharton, tourism is not ‘like some
version of wine tasting,’ nor a ‘mere aesthetic
diversion.’ (Barnes, 2002: 65) As Barnes writes:
She is, indeed, that rare and oxymoronic thing,
the wise tourist . . . Tourism for her is . . . not
passive but constructive, re-creative (Barnes,
2002: 65).
It is the re-creation that makes repetition possible.
Repetition fails, argues Kierkegaard, when it is tried as
some kind of experiment rather than a commitment.
We cannot half-heartedly ‘try it out’ to see how it
works because this failure of immersion makes us a
passive observer of ourselves. A committed attempt
would actually re-create a similar experience. A true
repetition cannot be observed but only engaged in.
Sartre also emphasizes the importance of constant recreation. In his explanation of radical freedom, he
makes use of an example involving a gambler that has
acknowledged his addiction, and has formed the
intention to never gamble again. The gambler soon
finds out, however, that he cannot rely on his previous
resolution. Each moment, the reformed gambler has
the freedom to backslide on his commitment. To be
authentic, he must constantly recommit to the goal, by
rehearsing his fear of the undesirable consequences of
his behaviour (Detmer, 2008).

Repeatable vs. Self-Exhausting Pleasures
It is helpful here to make use of a distinction between
what John Martin Fischer calls ‘repeatable pleasures’
and ‘self-exhausting pleasures.’ (Fischer, 1993) In an
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argument defending the idea that immortality might not
be as boring as some have suggested, he points out that
many pleasures bear repeating. Admittedly, eating
lobster every day, he suggests, might get tiresome. And
many ‘bucket-list’ type of activities, like climbing a
mountain just to prove that you can do it, or to check it
off your list, are ‘self-exhausting.’ They are worth
doing, but not worth repeating after they are banked.
Repeatable pleasures, on the other hand, are not
diminished by their duplication. Such pleasures include
eating when we are hungry; drinking wine; listening to
music; exercising one’s body; and seeing great art in
person.
We could add to the list of repeatable pleasures those
pleasures appropriate to pilgrimage; namely, the ritual
of prayer and meditation of walking. However, the
completion of the goal upon arriving at a pilgrimage
destination would be ‘self-exhausting’. It is true that
one cannot arrive at the cathedral in Santiago de
Compostella for the first time, twice. The first time is
an achievement, but subsequent pilgrimages should be
focused on the repeatable pleasures described above.
The goal of a pilgrimage should not be narrowly
focused on its completion, or on imitating the
experiences of others. Rather, the aim should be to be a
good pilgrim. In After Virtue, Alisdair MacIntyre
(2007) distinguishes between internal goods and
external goods. External goods are those external to a
practice. For example, he suggests, one can gain
‘prestige, status and money’ by playing chess.
However, these goods are external to the practice of
playing chess itself, and can be acquired by cheating at
the game, or in other ways than through chess playing.
Internal goods, by contrast, are those goods that can be
had only internal to a practice such as chess playing.
To play the game well and exercise the required skills
of strategy, etc., is a good internal to the practice, and
can be acquired in no other way.
The external goods of pilgrimage are the attainment of
certificates of completion, bragging rights, and bucket
list checking. Repetition of these achievements will be
pointless. Internal goods of pilgrimage are repeatable.
To travel well, as Kierkegaard suggests, will be to free
oneself from pre-conceived goals. If one plays the
game of pilgrimage well, the experience will not be
diminished by repetition. The aim will not be to get to
the end, and thus, one is potentially able to achieve the
goods available only internally to the practice; namely,
self-discovery and transformation of character through
the experience of voluntary hardship.
~ 15 ~

***
In Pamplona, a small town on the Camino trail,
one will find many people in the café bar Iruna
- which Hemmingway made famous in The Sun
Also Rises. On the walls are many amazing
photos of him at this very bar, but as long as we
are content to look passively at the photos, we
will never repeat the experiences depicted in
the photos. The trick is to somehow get inside
the photo, and actively participate in the
experience of drinking at the bar. You must be
spontaneous rather than deliberate.
Back on the Camino trail, the season may be
different - along with the weather, the itinerary,
and the people you meet. Importantly, the
walker him / herself will be different. The theme
of William Boyd’s Any Human Heart, is the
interesting observation that our past selves are
so different from the way we are now, that we
might as well be different people (Boyd, 2002).
Perhaps we return to places to recover the
connecting thread between these selves. The
rhythm of walking renews a sense of calm and
joyous appreciation of the day. The attitude of
voluntary simplicity returns as one gets used to
owning nothing but what can be carried on
your back. The routine acts of washing socks,
unrolling the sleeping bag and re-organizing
the pack are all repeated ceremoniously. As one
settles in for the night, one is again surrounded
by bruised and aching bodies in all states of
undress, and one is thankful for a simple bed
and a bottom bunk.
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